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Dark Open Innovation in a Criminal Organizational Context: 
the Case of Madoff’s Ponzi Fraud 
Abstract 
 Purpose 
 This paper investigates the processes of open innovation in the context of a fraudulent 
organization and, using the infamous Bernie L. Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS) 
fraud case, introduces and elaborates upon the concept of dark open innovation. The 
paper’s conceptual framework is drawn from social capital theory, which is grounded on 
the socio-economics of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam and is employed in order to make 
sense of the processes that occur within dark open innovation. 
   
 Design/methodology/approach 
 Given the self-evident access issues, this paper is necessarily based on archival and 
secondary sources taken from the court records of Madoff v New York—including victim 
impact statements, the defendant’s Plea Allocution, and academic and journalistic 
commentaries—which enable the identification of the processes involved in dark open 
innovation. Significantly, this paper also represents an important inter-disciplinary 
collaboration between academic scholars variously informed by business and history 
subject domains. 
  
 Findings  
 Although almost invariably cast as a positive process, innovation can also be evidenced as 
a negative or dark force. This is particularly relevant in open innovation contexts, which 
often call for the creation of extended trust and close relationships. This paper outlines a 
case of dark open innovation. 
  
 Research limitations/implications  
 A key implication of this study is that organizational innovation is not automatically 
synonymous with human flourishing or progress. This paper challenges the automatic 
assumption of innovation being positive and introduces the notion of dark open 
innovation. Although this is accomplished by means of an in-depth single case, the 
findings have the potential to resonate in a wide spectrum of situations. 
  
 Practical implications  
 Innovation is a concept that applies across a range of organization and management 
domains. Criminals also innovate; thus, the paper provides valuable insights into the 
organizational innovation processes especially involved in relation to dark open 
innovation contexts. 
  
 Social implications 
 It is important to develop and fully understand the possible wider meanings of innovation 
and also to recognise that innovation—particularly dark open innovation—does not 
always create progress. The Caveat Emptor warning is still relevant. 
  
Originality/value  
The paper introduces the novel notion of dark open innovation.  
Keywords: Dark Open Innovation, Social Capital, Ponzi/Affinity Fraud. 
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Introduction 
 
Innovation, which broadly involves the facilitation and generation of, inter alia, new ideas, 
products, and markets (Marques, 2014), has—both historically and conventionally—been 
cast as beneficial and positive for both individuals and organizations. In this vein, many 
definitions and variations of innovation have been developed in recent decades (Johannessen, 
Olsen and Lumpkin; 2001; Christensen, Scott, and Roth, 2013; Hedström and Wennberg, 
2016). The extant literature readily acknowledges that nurturing and engendering innovation 
presents challenges and difficulties, including: wasted energy and materials, misguided 
energy, and over-zealous or poorly understood ‘disruptive innovation’ (Markides, 2006; 
Hung and Chou, 2013). However, the overall positive couching and general desirability of the 
concept and notion of innovation obscures its darker side (Molina-Morales, Martínez-
Fernández & Torlò, 2011). The argument of this paper is that there is scope to view 
innovation as an ambivalent concept; one that can be understood as either facilitating positive 
outcomes—as evidenced in the extant literature—or as being negative and malignant. In 
consequence, innovation needs not only to be understood as having the potential to be 
creative and progressive, but also to be acknowledged as dark, destructive and regressive in a 
manner that has far reaching impacts; for instance, disruptive innovation. 
 
To this end, this paper expands the notion of open innovation by proposing and extending it 
to encompass the new concept of ‘dark (open) innovation’. It does do by analysing a recent 
egregious example of destructive financial innovation: the BLMIS Ponzi/affinity scandal 
(Zuckoff, 2005). The corrupt BLMIS organization was synonymous with its founder and 
chief executive Bernie Lionel Madoff; the analytical lens of this study thus focusses on the 
innovative processes by which he negatively created a toxic and criminal culture that 
facilitated one of the largest financial frauds in the history of capitalism. This paper develops 
the view that there is a robust connection between human dynamics and innovation; for 
example, the instance of intangible assets being integral to ‘roping’ investors into sharing 
investment opportunities. In consequence, this article will examine how Madoff built up his 
intangible assets, including his reputation, as an essential component of his fraud. As this is 
an important and understudied topic, the development of a greater awareness and 
understanding of dark open innovation processes is vital for management practitioners to 
avoid being drawn into similar compromising situations. Such knowledge can enable 
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practitioner audiences to better protect and nurture both their personal and organizational 
assets and reputations. This leads to the following research question: 
 
How do processes of ‘dark open innovation’, as a form of open innovation, operate 
and what are the implications for organizations and management practitioners?  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. It first elaborates upon the notion of open innovation, 
introducing and developing the concept of dark open innovation. It then outlines its 
methodological approach and presents the Madoff’s Ponzi/affinity fraud as an example of 
dark open innovation. It concludes by proceeding to analyse how Madoff expertly used his 
acute insights into human dynamics in order to create a criminally focussed network the 
assets of which, such as trust and reputation, were used to entice his investors and victims. 
Madoff’s sentencing transcript, which—together with their related documents and 
commentaries—provide the sole data available on this case, are an archival source of 
information on how the investors viewed their enticement into this dark open innovation 
system. 
 
Literature Review 
Marques (2014) broadly defined innovation as: “[an] on-going process of learning, looking, 
and investigating, which results in new items, new strategies, new types of association and 
new markets”. Moreover, Anderson, Potočnik, and Zhou (2014:4) pointed at the role played 
by the creative dimension of innovation and suggested that “Creativity and innovation at 
work are the process, outcomes, and products of attempts to develop and introduce new and 
improved ways of doing things.” In recent decades, the debate has widened to incorporate 
‘closed’ and ‘open’ innovation (Worsnop, Miraglia and Davies, 2016). ‘Closed innovation’ 
represents the conventional and earlier view of innovation in which the related research and 
innovative activities were conducted primarily within a given organization and the resulting 
expertise and resources—together with the knowledge products and outputs—remained 
proprietorial to that organization. In the globalized and radically transforming world of 
shared technologies and ideas, the sustainability of this approach has been questioned and the 
way pointed towards a more ‘open orientation’ (Chesbrough, 2003). Felin and Zenger 
(2014:1) described open innovation as follows: 
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“Open innovation scholars have focused on the need for focal organizations to 
transcend their boundaries by sourcing knowledge and technology externally … The 
notion of open innovation has encompassed a wide range of external actors, including 
users, customers, suppliers, universities, and competitors. The underlying 
mechanisms for accessing external knowledge and fostering open innovation have, in 
turn, encompassed a range of alternatives including contests and tournaments, 
alliances and joint ventures, corporate venture capital, licensing, open source 
platforms, and participation in various development communities.” 
 
Natalicchio et al. (2017) recently conducted a systematic literature review and, by 
adopting a knowledge management lens, distinguished the three main open innovation 
processes—i.e., inbound, outbound, and coupled; in doing so, they set an agenda for 
future research directions. The introductory comments show that Madoff’s fraud was 
likely to comprise all three elements, which heightens the complexity of the phenomenon 
of dark open innovation. Unlike most previous studies, which had examined the 
performance effects of open innovation on high-tech and large enterprises, the study 
conducted by Wang, Guo & Yin (2017) focussed on the antecedents of open innovation 
strategies in high- and low-tech, large and small firms; their findings reveal that different 
forms of organizational slack divergently influence corporate open innovation strategies, 
thus enhancing our understanding of the relationship between organizational slack and 
knowledge search behaviours in a broader context, and providing a better comprehension 
of the moderating effects of absorptive capacity (Wang, Guo & Yin, 2017). Interestingly, 
Martinez-Conesa, Soto-Acosta & Carayannis (2017) showed that information technology-
supported operations and commitment-based human resource practices generally have a 
positive and significant influence on knowledge management capabilit ies. However, 
their findings did not provide corroborative evidence in relation to the relationship 
between interdepartmental connectedness and knowledge management capability, 
whereas both the latter and environmental dynamism have a direct influence on open 
innovation—thus being potential factors in the case under consideration. Furthermore, 
Miglietta, Battisti & Garcia-Perez (2018) investigated the potential relationship between 
shareholder value and open innovation, and particularly highlighted the fact that, by adopting 
different open innovation practices, US-listed companies can create more value for 
shareholders in the long term while, at the same time, beating the market. In a slightly 
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differing vein and by addressing the management of knowledge via intellectual property 
rights from the individual (personal), project and company levels, Bican, Guderian & 
Ringbeck (2017) viewed the process of open innovation beyond its normative modus 
operandi, considering the preparations for, and termination of, its related activities. In 
this vein, and appropriately for the Madoff milieu, Casprini et al. (2017) found a link 
between the rather underexplored topic of open innovation and the family business 
context. They did so by means of an empirically grounded model that illustrates how the 
idiosyncratic capabilities of a family-owned firm can help overcome the critical barriers 
to obtaining and disseminating knowledge while pursuing an open innovation strategy.  
 
Thus, while the extant work has generated valuable observations, overall, the notion and 
practice of open innovation have been generally cast in a positive light. However, an 
emergent strand of literature has more assertively considered what is termed the ‘dark side’ of 
innovation (Gravier & Swartz, 2009; He & Tian, 2013; Molina-Morales, Martínez-Fernández 
& Torlò, 2011). This ‘dark side’ runs counter to the general positive account of innovation 
suggested in much of the literature and points at the dysfunctional aspects found in 
innovation processes; these, for example, include the manner in which innovation projects 
can place staff under additional pressure, engender failure in innovation partnerships due to 
over-optimism, rhetoric, and mistrust, or undermine the embedded ties between suppliers and 
customer, which can impede customer innovation knowledge (Noordhoff et al, 2011). The 
dark side of innovation is particularly striking in open innovation contexts. While much 
research has been conducted in relation to varying contexts and communities in which open 
innovation commonly occurs—i.e., teamwork, leadership, creative and social media (Dictoff, 
2015; Gatzweiler, Blazevic & Piller, 2017; Saleh & Hu, 2016)—the financial arena and, in 
particular, acts of fraud committed in that domain have been relatively under-researched. 
There is thus scope to consider these dimensions in a more granular fashion as they have 
major impacts on, and implications for, markets, economic sectors, and also society in 
general. 
 
The above discussion also shows that innovation commonly involves a range of relations that 
are grounded in various forms of social capital, which concerns the relationships that occur 
between individuals and between individuals and organizations linked to the creation of 
actions and value (Hitt and Ireland, 2002). In particular, social capital theory points at those 
resources that are not necessarily available to people by means of acquisition or inheritance, 
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but rather through their connection with other individuals (Lin. 2001). Therefore, networking 
is, in many forms—including innovation processes—key to the creation of capital, (Anderson, 
2010:3; Dess and Shaw, 2001). 
 
As a body of thought, social capital evolved during the early 20th century and has come to be 
viewed as a means of countering the societal divisions brought about by neo-liberal 
capitalism and marketization (Baker 2012). Epistemologically, social capital is associated 
with three established theorists: Bourdieu, who took a Marxist perspective and demonstrated 
how notions such as ‘honourability and respectability’ provide opportunities to accumulate 
capital (Bourdieu, 1985); Coleman, who looked at the drivers in education and nurturing 
found in family life rather than in class (Field, 2003); and Putnam, who, building on, and 
reacting to, earlier work, focussed more on communitarian—as opposed to individual—
actions in building social capital: “social networks, and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam, 2000:19). In particular, Putnam identified 
bonding capital—“inward looking [networks that] tend to reinforce exclusive identities and 
homogeneous groups” (Putnam, 2000: 22)—and bridging capital—“outward looking and 
encompass people across diverse social cleavages” (Putnam 2000:22). He stated that, 
whereas bonding capital works like ‘superglue’, bridging capital works as ‘WD40’ (i.e., an 
unlocking/lubricant oil) (Putnam 2000:23). As will be seen in the discussion below, social 
capital resonates considerably with the processes and dynamics that underpin open 
innovation—and, as in the particular case under consideration, the dark open innovation 
involved in Madoff’s Ponzi scheme—and is therefore employed as the over-arching 
conceptual framework for the argument below.  
 
Moreover, historical contextualization needs to be provided in addition to the social and 
cultural fabric surrounding (dark) innovation. The general positive and progressive (as 
opposed to dark) casting of innovation can be seen as having deep social and historical roots 
which can be traced back to, for example, the ‘Whig view’ of history and progress derived 
from the British political movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the 
emergence of the Enlightenment (Stokes, 2016). The Whig view of history, that sees things 
‘getting better’, has been challenged in modern historiography to the extent that the term 
‘Whig’ is now mainly used in a pejorative acception (Carr, 1985:55). In business and 
management, however, the untrammelled optimistic Whig interpretation is still evident, with 
the dark side of contemporary concepts tending to receive far less attention than its usually 
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well-researched positive one. For example, Brenkhert observed that the drawbacks of 
entrepreneurship are under-discussed and he detailed the common motivational roots shared 
by entrepreneurs, criminals, and juvenile delinquents. He also noted deception, manipulation, 
and authoritarianism as unedifying behaviours, frequently exhibited by entrepreneurs, which 
tend to be omitted in the largely positive conceptual literature (2002:6). Innovation is perhaps 
a case in point also in the fact that open innovation is purported as an inevitable, inexorable, 
and, in many regards, positive force. In the light of the changes brought about by 
globalization—swift technological exchanges and advancements, capital transfers, market 
expansion, and wealth generation (Baldwin, 2016)—open innovation appears as an inevitable 
and appropriate corollary. Collaborating, sharing risks and costs, accessing the best 
knowledge available (wherever it may reside, either within or outside a firm) are central 
tenets of open innovation approaches. However, they also present risks. Operating in such 
networks and in these manners also requires faith, trust, and confidence in the integrity and 
bona fide nature of the efforts and activities being undertaken (Sol, Beers, and Wals, 2013; 
Mathews and Stokes, 2013). In those instances in which this essential aspect or ‘glue’ is 
absent, situations become prone to dark open innovation. Thus, ‘dark open innovation’ can be 
understood as an act (or acts), idea, product, or arrangement that, by appearing encouraging 
and beneficial (based on perceived trust), seems to offer positive opportunities to the parties 
involved, but is ultimately likely to cause substantial harm and damage. This is because this 
form of innovation lacks ‘good faith’, is disingenuous, has a weak basis of trust and may even 
be grounded on a deceitful or criminal premise. Dark open innovation ultimately denigrates 
and destroys value rather than augmenting it. The next stage of this paper develops the 
methodology and empirical case used in order to explore the issue of dark open innovation. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The paper employs a qualitative approach (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Silverman, 2011). The 
data were developed through a case construction of the Madoff Ponzi fraud (Edmondson & 
McManus, 2007; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Fraud is usually classified within a sub-
division of criminology, termed white-collar crime or corporate crimes of the powerful 
(Newburn, 2007). Furthermore, the fraud domain is notoriously challenging to examine 
because of litigious and reporting constraints as well the occasional dangers that might arise 
when approaching and engaging with a criminal research area (Payne, 2012:4-19). Therefore, 
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the data were necessarily drawn from, inter alia: court reports, subsequent enquiries, 
academic articles, trial reports, and journalistic analyses and commentaries. The purpose of 
victim impact statements is to enable victims to personalize and detail the impact of a crime, 
which is termed therapeutic justice (Cassell and Eraz, 2011). In the case under examination—
United States V Bernard L. Madoff—167 substantial statements were submitted; out of these, 
the prosecution chose to submit 113 substantial statements, with nine victims permitted to 
speak at the sentencing trial. The statements therefore comprise the views of only a fraction 
of the defrauded. For example, financial institutions, which suffered the biggest losses—e.g., 
Banco Santander (US$2.87 billion) and Bank Medici (US$2.1 billion)—as well as charities 
and celebrity investors did not submit any statements, perhaps to avoid negative publicity. 
For example, Lewis (2012) concluded that a common response to being defrauded is a state 
of denial, while Perry and Brody (2011:35-38) also discussed the difficulties of responding to 
“a betrayal of trust”. The statements, which are therefore unrepresentative per se, are 
nevertheless valuable for their role in ‘shaping the Madoff narrative’ in the sphere of public 
opinion. One can also speculate that the statements articulated the views shared by other 
BLMIS investors; three themes relating to human dynamics and facilitating criminal 
innovation can be identified through them. 
  
The research was observant of issues linked to structuring the data within the case 
presentation (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2013). This approach responds to Siggelkow (2007), 
who signalled the need to accompany in-depth cases with secondary supporting and 
triangulating data drawn from various documentary sources. The analytical approach adopted 
a template analysis (King & Horrocks, 2010) structuring, which, within the overall 
conceptual framework, enabled the emergence of themes and sub-themes from the archive 
and documentary sources. The reliability of the account was reinforced by the reading of 
materials with independent coding and subsequent convergent authorial team coding.  
 
Dark Open Innovation: Background to the Bernie Madoff Case 
“Had the stock market in the US not collapsed, Madoff’s scam would probably have 
continued” (Arvedlund, 2009:263). 
Bernie Madoff’s parents, Ralph and Zara, ran a small brokerage firm that was investigated by 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) for failing to submit financial documents (Nars, 
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2009:194). Their son followed in the family trade, founding Bernard L. Madoff Investment 
Securities (BLMIS) in 1960. He later claimed that he had earned his initial investment stake 
by working as a lifeguard at city beaches. This sort of anecdote was typical of the disarming 
storytelling approaches used to build trust across an open innovation setting. In the early 
1960s, Madoff concentrated on making markets for small parcels of bonds. His ambition was 
to expand BLMIS so that he could enter the more lucrative trading equities market. An 
important observation in this regard is that the process of dark open innovation started from 
relatively small beginnings and then grew incrementally. In a cautionary fashion, this 
underlines the importance of spotting dark open innovation (as opposed to more positive 
open innovation) at the earliest possible time. 
 
At first, BLMIS struggled to attract clients and Madoff focussed his energy on exploiting his 
familial and friendship and religious/ethnic ties, as his: “… early investment clients were 
friends and relatives in the New York Jewish Community” (Arvedlund, 2009:25). Madoff, 
who was an expert at inspiring trust, charmed his way via his family ties into the 
acquaintance of retired attorneys, teachers, and other professionals who started to invest in 
his supposedly ‘conservative’ investment fund. The fund then started to develop rapidly when 
wealthy accountant Sol Alpern began spreading the word on Madoff’s ability to provide 
excellent returns. Alpern, however, had failed to mention to his wealthy clients that, by 
making successful introductions, he too stood to benefit from the business (Ibid:25-28). In 
criminology terminology, Madoff was following an affinity fraud operating strategy, which 
refers to investment scams that prey upon members of identifiable groups (networks), such as 
racially, religiously, and ethnically defined communities, the elderly, and professional groups, 
or other groups likely to engender forms of open innovation sharing and mutual support. 
Furthermore, the fraudsters who promote affinity scams frequently are—or pretend to be—
members of the groups they target (Perri and Brody, 2011:34). This is an approach typically 
adopted by financial criminals, who prey on their own communities by exploiting trust-based 
interactions, as researched by Ventura and Daniel, (2010), who noted the prevalence of 
religious affinity frauds, and by Perri and Brody (2011), who investigated church-based 
affinity based frauds. From a dark open innovation perspective, it is interesting to note the 
role played by ‘corollary advocates’—in the case under examination, Alpern, who spread 
‘good news’ reports regarding Madoff’s highly innovative and successful work. The potency 
of such championing of innovation was underscored by Howell and Boies (2004); however, 
in the Madoff case, its potential negative downside is indicated. 
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Madoff’s firm prospered; in the early 1970s, he was credited with being one of the financial 
sector’s IT innovators. This provoked hostility from those established brokers who did not 
like computerization and, according to Madoff, “… even had congressional hearings against 
me” (Gelles and Tett, FT, 2011). Despite such opposition, BLMIS continued to prosper and 
established itself as one of the largest independent trading operations in the securities 
industry. In 2000, at the height of the Internet bubble, BLMIS held around US$300 million in 
assets and was ranked among the top trading and securities firms in the world. Driving this 
growth was Madoff’s assiduous cultivation of his reputation, both as an innovator and as 
‘America’s Financial Guru’. Madoff possessed entrepreneurial flair and even took the credit 
for the exploitation of computer technology to automate stock trading. He constructed an 
automated computer-based stock market that used the Cincinnati Stock Exchange License. 
The known leniency of the Cincinnati Stock Exchange rules may have been what attracted 
Madoff. It is also worth noting that the speed of technological change, which Madoff very 
much pioneered, posed challenges to the financial authorities, who found decentralized 
trading difficult to regulate or, perhaps, even to fully understand in terms of its potential to 
facilitate criminal activity (Arvedlund, 2009:40-44).  
 
In promoting technology-based trading, Madoff also established himself as a vocal lobbyist 
for deregulation: he donated heavily to both the Democratic and Republican campaigns and 
sat on a number of committees advising on stock market restructuring, as well as acting as the 
chairman of NASDAQ. He was solidly building his bonded social capital (Putnam, 2000). It 
is also significant that Madoff operated a hedge fund (these funds were not required to 
register with the SEC until 2006, and hence were not subject to any regulatory scrutiny) 
(Arvedlund, 2009:151). Madoff therefore exploited technological innovations, as well as 
regulatory lacunae to promote his firm and his criminal activity. By doing so, he set up the 
antecedents for a (dark) open innovation environment in which he could operate. Technology 
is frequently viewed as a central and positive dimension of innovation and innovative 
environments (Hemlin et al, 2014). However, the Madoff case clearly demonstrates that 
technological innovation also involve complex dimensions that a range of audiences may find 
difficult to follow readily and are therefore also propitious for dark open innovation when 
people exchange and share through them. Furthermore, Madoff acted as an advisor to the 
SEC on market structure and other issues, which bolstered his carefully cultivated image of 
consummate professional insider. Madoff even encouraged marriage between his family and 
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SEC members: his niece Shana married SEC staffer Eric Swanson, who was part of a 
commission team overseeing the planning of regulation pertaining to technological trading 
(Arvedlund, 2009:2011). Madoff’s social capital with the SEC was such that he would claim 
that, every time a SEC investigator came to his office, he or she would make a job application 
(Lewis, 2012:73). Innovation clearly requires control and governance at various junctures 
(Van Oudheusden, 2014); however, Madoff’s capacity for infiltrating and circumventing 
checks and balances through his dark open ‘innovative’ activities points at standard measures 
being clearly found to be wanting and to the need for a reflective and watchful series of 
safeguards. 
  
Madoff claimed that the fraud began in the 1990s, but the investigators held that the roots of 
constructing the dark open innovation context actually extended back to the 1980s. 
Alternatively, a further, more plausible, judgment is that BLMIS was a fraudulent 
organization from its inception. The fraud’s endurance and its innovation network, which was 
only exposed by the liquidity squeeze, can be explained with reference to a number of 
additional practices. First, Madoff cultivated a reputation for returning investments promptly; 
second, when the industry standard involved expensive investment fund fees, he charged very 
low commission; third, Madoff distributed lavish fees and commissions to feeder funds; and, 
fourth, his generous donations to charities created reputational capital to the point that it was 
hard to envisage this noted philanthropist to be anything but legitimate. Moreover, it is also 
little discussed and notable that not all investors lost money, as most took out more than they 
had invested (Nars, 2009:220). Thus, dark open innovation should not be considered to imply 
complete failure or value destruction (following Gauthier, 2014); at any rate, the Madoff case 
indicates that the overall picture might be variegated and questionable. 
 
In the financial sector, Madoff was unique for the consistency of his returns and for his low 
fees, and some industry insiders had harboured doubts in regard to his operation long before 
the collapse of the firm. For example, in 1999, certified fraud examiner Harry Markopolos 
was asked by his employers, ‘Rampart Investment Management’, to reverse engineer 
Madoff’s strategy to find out how he was winning their potential client’s business. 
Markopolos claimed: “When I saw the return stream, I knew it was a fraud in five minutes.” 
He also claimed it took him only 20 minutes to prove it: “His performance line went up at a 
45-degree angle; that only exists in geometry class. It was clearly impossible.” Another 
banker, Rob Picard, of the Royal Bank of Canada, reckoned it only took him 15 minutes 
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talking to Madoff to realise it was all a fraud (Arvedlund, 2009:90). Nevertheless, Madoff 
continued to prosper despite Markopolos’ best efforts to stop him, which included reporting 
his suspicions to the financial authorities:  
 
“Countless times over eight-and-a-half years—meetings, written submissions, e-mails, 
phone calls. [What I provided] went from six red flags to 30 red flags, and any one of 
them was enough to stop Madoff.” 
 
Madoff recollected that “Markopolos was the biggest idiot in the world … He had a hedge 
fund that couldn’t make money and his clients abandoned him [so he called the regulators]” 
(Gelles and Tett: F/T 2011: April 8). But the regulators did not take action. “The regulators 
get calls all the time,” Madoff said. They did not investigate “because I had the reputation at 
the time for being the gold standard. I had all the credibility. Nobody could believe at that 
time that I would do something like that. Why would I? Stupidity—that is why. But remember 
that, when people asked me about the strategy, it made sense. I was big, credible” (Gelles and 
Tett: F/T 2011: April 8). Madoff was convinced that he would be discovered on two 
occasions in 2003-4 and again in 2006. The SEC however, failed to check the basics, such as 
investigating his account with Wall Street’s clearing Houses, and with the dealing firms that 
were supposedly handling his trades. It is also notable that BLMIS was mistrusted by 
industry insiders. Goldman Sachs, for example, would not put Madoff’s fund on its approved 
list of intermediaries as his strategies would have required massive trading in stock options 
and derivatives, and none of their professionals had seen or heard of these trades. Credit 
Suisse also recommended its clients to withdraw their Madoff investments as it could not 
fathom how Madoff made its returns (Nars, 2009:212). 
 
Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in jail. Despite his apology in court, Madoff remained 
unrepentant, holding fast to the view that his investors in the innovative network knew that 
his returns were too good to be true and thus were willing accomplices in his fraud. 
According to a fellow inmate, Madoff was also increasingly angry about his incarceration, 
stating, “F*** my victims. I carried them for 20 years and now I’m doing 150 years” 
(Somaiya, Newsweek, 2010). 
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Dark Open Innovation and Human Relational Dynamics 
 
Human relational dynamics are central to the effecting of dark open innovation. The 
cautionary tale of Madoff highlights a range of warning signals (for dark open innovation) 
that need to be noted. Madoff purposefully targeted his own ethnic group in order to 
perpetrate his affinity fraud. Ethnicity is a concept defined with reference to language, 
religious, ancestral, and locational characteristics; the Madoffs both surrounded themselves 
with members of their own community, thus creating close proximity with those of a similar 
background who shared a sense of identification, which can be understood as “… the process 
whereby individuals see themselves as one with another person or group of people” 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998:256). This is the typical approach taken by ethnic minority 
entrepreneurs, who will trade within a network based on common values and experiences, 
relying on the trust of a shared social network (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). In social 
capital theory, similar insights are proposed by Putnam with regard to bonding capital 
(2000:362-3), Lin also points out that there tends to be a preference for homophilous 
interactions in networks (Lin, 1999:46-54). These observations are also detailed in 
Shibutani’s, ‘Reference Groups as Perspectives’, a concept that notes that economic activity 
is often based on shared socio-cultural and religious values and characteristics (Shibutani, 
1955:109). Madoff understood the importance of being embedded in an ethnic community: 
being identified as Jewish was not enough; he realized the necessity to be overtly embedded 
as a ‘leading’ and integral member of the community. This is a socio-economic insight, 
‘embeddedness’ being first coined by Karl Polanyi, who argued that:  
 
“… man’s economy, as a rule is submerged in social relationships. He does not act to 
safeguard his individual interests in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to 
safeguard his social standing, his social claim, his social assets. He values material 
goods so far as they serve this end.” (Polanyi, 1944/2001:60) 
 
Madoff acted in accordance with these insights and, for instance, donated heavily to ethnic 
(Jewish) charities, became a member of the Board of trustees for Yeshiva University, and 
proclaimed his devotion to the Jewish religion and culture. Madoff was perceptive enough to 
recognize that charity, and, more generally, philanthropic activities enacted within his own 
community were a strong opportunity to develop his feeder networks. This approach fitted in 
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with Madoff’s preferred sales pitch of avoiding financial or ‘capital introduction’ parties, 
which would be full of financially savvy investors who would ask too many awkward 
questions. Instead, Madoff preferred to target fellow philanthropists by means of word of 
mouth recommendations and, together with other members of his family, he made a 
concerted effort to court the charity circuit, sitting on the boards of many charities and 
donating money to many others. This networking provided Madoff with two main paybacks. 
First, it gave him access to high society, which added lustre to his brand, making him more 
respectable and, consequently, credible. Second, it enabled him to market his products 
aggressively to gullible charity commissioners and, hence, provided a lucrative source of 
investors. The Madoffs’ success lay in convincing charities to invest and be gauged by the 
reforms being planned to charitable foundations, altering their size and structure in order to 
decrease their reliance of ‘personal ties’ (Jagpal and Craig, 2009). In Hebrew, Madoff was 
described as a Shidduch—a matchmaker—and, in behavioural economics, both Ponzi and 
Madoff can be termed as ‘connectors’ (Gladwell, 2001:30-59). In network syntax, they 
cultivated ‘weak’ ties for ‘brokerage benefits’. Madoff was a key agent within the dark open 
innovation network he and others had created both individually and collectively. Madoff also 
developed weak ties driven by a shared characteristic of highly developed ‘people skills’, 
which is consistent, for example, with trait theory in terms of social competency being a 
recurring quality or trait of entrepreneurs (Baron and Markman, 2003).  
 
Madoff purposefully developed and innovated social capital weak ties to serve as recruitment 
networks. For example, Madoff was perceptive enough to realize no one was “… better to 
refer new clients than current satisfied clients” (Arvedlund, 2009:272-273). The fact that 
these agents usually took large commissions was kept secret from the investors and, as they 
brought clients into Madoff’s fund, the agents also grew inordinately wealthy. To illustrate 
the recruitment network, it is worth noting that Robert Jaffe, a noted philanthropist like 
Madoff, ‘worked’ the ‘Palm Beach Country Club’ to the extent that over 30% of its members 
eventually invested with Madoff. However, Jaffe failed to tell his ‘golf buddies’ about the 
commission he charged, or even about the fact that they were investing their funds with 
Madoff. In return for this deception, Jaffe became extremely wealthy, and the fraud continued 
apace. This deception also meant that a considerable number of investors in Madoff had had 
no idea that they were connected to the fraud until they received news that the Ponzi scheme 
had collapsed and that they had lost their investments. The degree of criminal complicity of 
Madoff’s agents is open to question (some may have been innocent), though Madoff himself 
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was in no doubt over their criminal culpability. For example, during his trial, he claimed that 
four of his earliest investors—Jeffry Picower, Stanley Chais, Norman Levy and Carl 
Shapiro—had helped recruit customers for his firm in the late 1980s, when Madoff was 
having difficulty unwinding positions in the markets; “They were complicit, all of them. 
Which is why they are all settling.” (Gelles and Tett, 2011: 8th April) 
 
Madoff and his agents grasped that their frauds depended on them being accepted as 
upstanding members of their own communities, as these provided the bulk of the investors. 
This perception is consistent with Fukuyama’s appreciation of culture in economic life, 
which concludes: “As Adam Smith well understood, economic life is deeply embedded in 
social life, and it cannot be understood apart from customs, morals, and habits of the society 
in which it occurs. In short, ‘it cannot be divorced from culture’” (Fukuyama, 1995:13).  
 
For this analysis, Burt’s (2005) two level reputation generating hypotheses are most apt. The 
first ‘bandwidth’ hypothesis chimes with everyday assumptions by which actors own their 
reputations, in the sense that they define their behaviours, which, in turn define their 
reputations. For instance, Madoff cultivated a brand identity that was conservative, reassuring, 
and always immaculately presented: a committed family man and vigorous philanthropist 
who did not live an ostentatious lifestyle. Besides being well-established on Wall Street, the 
wider Madoff network members were also viewed as smart, educated, admired, and 
respected: pillars of their community and model Americans. The Madoffs were also noted for 
their conservative values and, paradoxically, were associated with low risk investment 
strategies; to his cautious investors, Madoff appeared anti-risk. Furthermore, although his 
returns were good, they remained within the realms of what a skilful and ‘lucky’ trader could 
achieve in a good year—8-12% per annum—except for the fact that Madoff uniquely 
achieved these returns every year. Thus, the fraud was facilitated by Madoff’s apparent 
conservatism, which gave him a persona that was the opposite of a ‘get rich quick’ one. 
 
However, Madoff also exploited the processes described in Burt’s second ‘echo’ hypothesis. 
In this hypothesis, reputation is not owned by an individual but, rather, by “… the people in 
whose conversations it is built, and the goal of those conversations is not accuracy so much 
as bonding between the speakers” (Burt, 2005:195). In consequence, “The key to establishing 
a good reputation is to get people in closed networks talking to one another”, and, 
“Reputations do not emerge from good work directly so much as from colleagues’ stories 
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about the work … the source of the reputation is stories third parties are telling one another” 
(ibid: 219-22). Herein reside important observations in relation to the way in which news of 
innovation is shared and disseminated. The Madoffs appeared to grasp that positive gossip 
was essential to maintaining their reputational assets as, from this perspective, reputation is 
dependent on an individual’s freedom to make judgments; thus, reputation is transcendently 
motivated. 
 
Madoff was admired and much talked about as the former chairman of the NASDAQ stock 
market, a friend of regulators, and vice-chairman of the National Association of Securities 
Dealers, his industry’s self-regulatory body. He was also a role model in that he lived a gilded 
life, travelling with his family between a penthouse in New York and holiday homes in Palm 
Beach and Long Island, travelling in private jets and on his yacht. Madoff also understood the 
value of acts of kindness for spreading positive word of mouth, and consequently worked on 
his ‘good guy’ persona. For instance, in 2002, a rookie trader was seriously injured when he 
was hit by a car while training for the New York City marathon. “I passed out and woke up in 
the emergency room,” the trader remembers. “[When I came to,] I looked to one side of my 
bed, and my mom and dad were there. On the other side was Bernie”. Many employees 
‘loved’ working for the Madoffs and most stayed with them right up until the fraud was 
revealed. 
 
The Madoffs further enhanced their reputations by cultivating highly respected network ties 
that could serve as conduits to channel further victims into their fraud. In social capital 
literature, Lin noted that reputation is promoted by; “… recruiting actors with a reputation 
established elsewhere in society” (Lin 2001:154). Madoff fully understood the value of these 
network ties for facilitating his fraud; for example, he developed a close commercial 
relationship with Mike Engler, who ran a brokerage firm and, based on his exemplary war 
record, enjoyed high status in his suburban community. Engler convinced many veterans to 
invest with Madoff, and his military ties also served to draw in an extensive network of 
unsuspecting investors who, in turn, were connected to those veterans. To enhance his 
credibility and reputation, Ponzi had also made great play of his bank directorship of the 
hitherto respected Hanover Trust Company. 
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Dark Open Innovation and the Role of Trust 
 
An essential element for dark open innovation is the cultivation of relational trust (Möllering, 
2006), on which investors rely instead of carrying out their due diligence. In social capital 
literature, it has been contended that levels of trust are related to levels of social capital 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002). For example, Fukuyama stressed the importance of trust and 
‘ingrained ethical habit’ (1995) for ‘lubricating’ market-based transactions. Cohen and 
Prusak’s view is also relevant:  
 
“Trust is largely situational: a particular person may be quite trustworthy in one set 
of circumstances, but not in another, where particular pressures, temptations, fears, 
or confusion may make him unreliable.” (2001:30) 
 
As noted, Madoff further targeted high trust religious/ethnic settings and social structures. 
For instance, Madoff was skilled at targeting investors when they were at their most trusting; 
this was noted by Judge Chin, who admitted to being swayed in the severity of his sentence 
by a victim statement of a widow, who recalled that she had gone to see Madoff following 
her husband’s heart attack. She recounted how Madoff had put his arm around her to express 
his condolences and said, “Don’t worry; your money is safe with me”. The widow 
subsequently lost all of her savings (Arvedlund, 2009:275). Madoff’s technique was to 
interact or approach investors in non-financial settings, ingratiating himself in social and 
religious milieus; he knew that these environments fostered an ambience of trust in which 
investors would be more likely to see him as ‘one of us’ and, in consequence, let their 
financial guard down. These trusting environments included country clubs both in Palm 
Beach and the Hamptons and synagogues in Florida, New York, Minnesota, and Los Angeles 
(Arvedlund, 2009:26).  
 
Madoff was also expert at gaining trust without giving up a lot of information. This is 
significant as high levels of trust and a culture of shared values facilitate white-collar crime. 
Conversely, in low-trust scenarios, transactions are scrutinized in detail and economic actors 
are wary of being cheated. Therefore, although high trust scenarios can create economic 
advantages—for instance, in terms of reduced transaction costs—at the same time, they 
provide opportunities for fraud. For example, Madoff followed a typical scam strategy in 
claiming to have privileged ‘insider knowledge’ based on connections. Thus Madoff was 
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viewed as possessing exclusive bridging social capital (Putnam, 2000) or network brokerage 
opportunities that offered privileged investors access to highly lucrative investment 
opportunities. This, high levels of trust can be observed in the loyalty of Madoff’s investors, 
with widows recounting how their deceased husbands had implored them “to never sell their 
Madoff holdings” (ibid: 50). What Granovetter noted from a social network perspective is 
also significant: that victim/offender relationships in financial scams are based on surprising 
levels of intimacy (Granovetter, 1992:43-44). In Madoff’s case, it has been claimed that this 
intimacy extended to a shared set of beliefs. For example:  
 
“To stay in Madoff’ game, they agreed to cooperate with his deceptions. They 
honored his request to not talk about him or to tell others that he was managing their 
money. They didn’t do due diligence.” (Arvedlund, 2009:220) 
 
One evaluation is that Madoff was able to cultivate trust-based relations to conceptualize his 
investors as his business friends. From this perspective, he cultivated work-based 
relationships as something less than social friendships, but more than purely economic 
transactional arrangements. Theoretically, this understanding is consistent with the 
Aristotelian-based interpretation that, “… business friendships are instances of ‘incomplete 
friendships for utility’” (Schonsheck, 2000:897). Moreover, Aristotle assumed a hierarchy of 
friendships ranging from complete to incomplete; therefore, business friendships can be 
interpreted as “Incomplete friendships for utility … [which] are not based on reciprocal love 
of character; the basis is reciprocal utility, reciprocal value” (ibid). Put another way, “In a 
utility friendship, a relationship is externally useful to both people”. Translating this 
observation into the Madoffs’ fraud, they offered investors the apparent opportunity for high 
returns and their investors, in turn, offered them willing victims. 
 
A primary theme articulated within the court documents was an acute sense of Madoff’s 
treachery, not only to individual investors, but more so to the wider community, as one 
investor stated, 
 
“What Bernard L. Madoff did far transcends the loss of money. It involves his 
betrayal of the virtues of people hold dearest-love, friendship, trust-and all so he can 
eat at the finest restaurants, stay at the most luxurious resorts, and travel on yachts 
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and private jets. He has truly earned his reputation for being the most despised 
person to in America today.” 
 
Affinity fraud can be interpreted as a ‘hate crime’ (Fairfax, 2003); one can speculate as to 
whether there was an element of self-loathing about Madoff, manifested in defrauding his 
own ethnic/religious community, or, more prosaically, whether he targeted this community 
out of mere opportunism. It is notable that Madoff never lost his outsider status—or his 
distinctive Lower East Side twang—among the wealthy Manhattan elite (Vanity Fair 2009). 
Thus, although he was part of the financial establishment—perhaps the ultimate insider—
there was a part of him that was perennially cast as the upstart from the wrong side of the 
tracks. 
 
In overview, the trial statements constantly allude to a betrayal of community-based trust. A 
number of statements also draw attention to reports and commentaries that stereotype the 
investors (Lewis, 2012:46) as being interested in money; this is ironic, as it has been 
suggested that the fraud was facilitated by investors not conducting due diligence. The 
investors—“people who knew how to make money” (Perri and Brody, 2011:46)—were 
desperate to avoid living up to the negative stereotypes that were eventually reinforced when 
the fraud collapsed. Thus, there was a sense of betrayal of trust that was not confined to 
individual, ego-centric relations, but at the communal, socio-centric level. A key part of 
Madoff’s BLMIS operations was to target his own community to exploit those ties that create 
trust, respect, and friendship, and that are usually considered an asset of such groups. This is 
a common approach both in affinity- and in religious-based frauds (Perri and Brody, 2011; 
Ventura and Daniel, 2010). Madoff and his co-religionist associates targeted their own 
faith/ethnic community, thus creating close proximity with those, of a similar background, 
who shared a sense of identification, which can be understood as “… the process whereby 
individuals see themselves as one with another person or group of people” (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). Madoff thus established his fraud based upon affinity, which also 
made it harder to detect. as “cautious skepticism is replaced by social banter” (Reed, 2007). 
Affinity frauds also tend to be more protracted than other types because of group cohesion: 
Perri and Brody (2011) also noted how social banter replaces due diligence. 
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Of further relevance is Coleman’s view that social capital is more likely to be created as an 
oppositional response “… where one type of actor is weaker in a relationship … the actors of 
this type will be likely to develop social networks that have closure, in order to strengthen 
their position relative to the more powerful type of actor” (Coleman, 1990:319). Coleman 
analysed this bonding capital in social capital literature; he noted the robust religious and 
community bonds that enabled the Orthodox Jewish community to dominate the New York 
diamond trade due to the advantages of high levels of trust and consequent low transaction 
costs. The reverse side of this high trust context however, is that a skilful swindler—in part 
by emphasizing ethnic ties—could exploit this community resource. For example, the 
Madoffs stressed their allegiances to Jewish norms. Ruth Madoff, for example, had co-
authored ‘The Great Chefs of America Cook Kosher’ (1996), and the family donated 
ostentatiously to Jewish charities and universities. Thus, although Madoff was described at 
his sentencing trial as ‘an equal opportunities destroyer’ the Jewish community suffered 
disproportionately. 
‘The effect on the American Jewish community was viral: 39% of American Jews 
were affected in some way, either because an organization or charity they supported 
had been affected by the Madoff crimes (29%) or because someone they knew had 
been affected (17%)’ (Arvedlund, 2009:25-26). 
A second theme to emerge from the trial statements is the vehemence of the victim narrative, 
which is vituperative and ‘ad hominem’ in its focus. For example, “He’s an economic 
terrorist”. A third theme stresses that the victims had suffered losses of unimaginable 
magnitude. For instance, one victim stated that “It is impossible to compare this crime to any 
past criminal act”.  This is an attempt to shape the narrative away from the investors being 
greedy and complicit to being entirely innocent victims. Thus, the sub-text is that the 
investors refused to take any responsibility for what had happened to them in the con. This is 
a common investor reaction to the exposure of affinity fraud: a complete denial of culpability 
at any level. Conversely, Madoff remained convinced of his investors’ shared culpability in 
the con. A consequence of this investor refusal to acknowledge any culpability was the 
consistent theme, in the victim statements, of blaming the SEC and other financial regulators 
for failing to identify and close down BLMIS, and implicitly to lay the grounds for appeals 
for recompense.  
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“There are many levels of government complicity in this crime. The SEC, by its total 
incompetence and criminal negligence, has allowed this psychopath to steal from me 
and steal from the world”. 
 
This accusation, moreover, has validity; Madoff had developed close ties with the SEC by 
training its newly appointed lawyers in the hard-to-codify, context-specific insider knowledge 
of Wall Street, resulting in a tie relationship that (quid pro quo) screened him from the 
concentrated gaze of investigators. This theme of refusing to accept responsibility or any 
level of collaboration in the fraud contributed to the wider narrative of the investors being, 
above all else, victims who had been betrayed not only by Madoff, but also by the financial 
regulators, who had failed to discharge their regulatory duties. Hence, the authorities were in 
part culpable and therefore needed to recompense the investors/victims.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Dark open innovation requires the illusion of trust and confidence. The case examined above 
clearly underlines that it also often involves obfuscation through the use of poorly understood 
or complex technological systems. It is also possible to suggest that dark open innovation is 
easier to perpetrate in ‘white collar’ and service contexts, in which products are intangible 
and results and immediate consequences more difficult to glean or perceive than, for example, 
physical products. Nevertheless, building the necessary social capital and securing positions 
inside influential innovation strategy and policy bodies—even to the point of having relatives 
marrying into them—are imperative for the fraudster. Thus, dark open innovation frequently 
exploits close community or close circle ties and there is a need to be watchful of this. Bernie 
Madoff’s exploitation of the New York Jewish community of which he was part is a prime 
example of this. With regard to further managerial implications, there is a need to develop 
alerting mechanisms, early warning signs, and invasive investigatory actions within closely-
knit private and professional communities, the vulnerability of which to dark open innovation 
should be highlighted. 
 
As a master at exploiting the dis-utilities of human dynamics, Madoff resembled many white-
collar fraudsters; hence, his crimes were predicated on sophisticated socio-economic insights 
into social interaction. The human dynamics perspective elaborated upon above complements 
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the wider literature on, for example, criminology by examining crime’s human factors and 
drawing attention to the resources that are inherent in the fraudsters’ social interactions and 
structures in what remains the most heavily regulated industry in America. In consequence, 
this paper has challenged the propensity of the innovation literature to cast innovation as 
predominantly positive despite its noted setbacks and challenges. However, this paper has 
introduced the concept of dark open innovation and the potentially dangerous implications it 
has in relation to the social capital developed between individuals, managers, and 
organizations. The argument has sought to engage a range of literature sources by which to 
elaborate this notion and also to broaden and inform the overall literature on open innovation. 
By considering the recurring features of fraud from a social capital perspective, this paper has 
not only investigated the exploitative effects of social networks, but has also presented an 
expanded perspective that emphasizes the persistent human dynamic realities of social 
interaction in financial crime, such as Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. A major implication for 
managers is to seek demonstrable substance in regard to exceptional performance indicators. 
Equally, where doubts and rumours have circulated, these should be subjected to serious 
consideration, rather than being discounted. Here, the everyday adages suited to capture this 
spirit could include “no smoke without fire” and “if it looks too good to be true…”. This 
article has also examined the more qualitative embedded relational social realities within 
innovation networks and processes that are built up over time through reiterated interactions 
to create the social fabric of criminal network structures. From this perspective, this paper has 
demonstrated that innovation needs to move beyond its all-too-frequent orthodox soft, 
positive, and consensual view of benign capitalism to, rather, examine more closely how 
innovation processes are able to facilitate dis-utilities, such as white-collar crime. 
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